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Abstract
Why are stock prices much more volatile than the underlying dividends? The excess
volatility of prices can in principle be attributed to two different causes: time-varying
discount rates for expected future dividends, arising from variation in risk premia; or
the irrational exuberance of investors, bidding prices up and down even in the absence
of changes in the underlying value of the asset. No consensus has so far emerged among
economists as to the prevalence of one or the other source of price variation.
I propose in this paper a novel way to approach this problem, by identifying changes
in the uncertainty faced by investors regarding the fundamental value of an asset and
exploiting the different response in prices that such changes in uncertainty would gen-
erate through sentiments or risk premia. I then apply this framework to the S&P
500 index from 1872 till 2019: the positive correlation found between uncertainty and
prices (or, equivalently, the negative correlation between uncertainty and implied risk
premia) is not compatible with rational investors’ behavior and suggests instead the
presence of a significant sentiments component in stock prices.
Key words: uncertainty, risk premium, sentiments; information, financial markets.
JEL classification: D81, D83, G12, G14, G41.
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1 Introduction and related literature
1.1 Introduction
Stock prices are notoriously volatile, much more than the underlying stream of future pay-
ments an asset entitles to. This fact has attracted the attention of economists for a long
time, earning the status of a puzzle (see, e.g„ [42, Shiller (1981)] and [36, LeRoy and Porter
(1981)]).
Two main approaches have been taken to explain the excess volatility of stock prices:
one appeals to the notion of sentiments, or fads, as presented in [43, Shiller (1989)], and
identifies the irrational behavior of investors at the basis of such excessive price variation;
the other maintains instead the notion of investors’ rationality and points to time-varying
discount rates, due to changes in expected returns and risk premia, as the cause of excess
price volatility, as argued by [23, Cochrane (1991)] in his review of Shiller’s book.
The first approach appeals to irrationality, psychology, herd behavior and similar con-
cepts to explain large variations in prices not accounted for by comparable variations in
the underlying fundamental value. It rejects the idea that prices are efficient, in the sense
that they incorporate all available information at any given time, and instead argues that
their movements are often not warranted by changes in traders’ information and should be
attributed to irrational, or non-information based, behavior.
The second approach is grounded instead in the assumption that investors make rational
decisions, given their available information. While this statement is easily formulated, its
verification relies on the possibility to observe what available information investors have at
any given time. Changes in information can impact on expected future dividends or on
discount rates, in both cases affecting prices. Early tests of market rationality were based
on constant discount rates and easily rejected the notion of rationality: there is simply
too much variation in prices compared to the variation in dividends or earnings. It has
since been acknowledged that time-varying risk premia, and thus discount rates, need to
be accounted for if one wants to have any chance of settling the question regarding excess
market volatility. For any time series of prices and dividends, it is always possible to derive a
time-series of discount rates that justifies observed prices as fundamental values: the question
then becomes what moves those discount rates, and whether their volatility is "excessive"
compared to what would be expected in a market populated by rational investors.
1
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Available models of time-varying discount rates, such as the consumption-based asset
pricing model, don’t seem to be able to account for the large variation in risk premia required
to match the excess volatility in prices. Rejections of volatility tests imply that specific
discount-rate models leave a residual unexplained: as [23, Cochrane (1991)] points out, one
might decide to call such residual "sentiments", but it might just represent a shortcoming of
our current models rather than a lack of rationality in investors’ behavior.
Instead of trying to account for such residuals, or, equivalently, for the total volatility of
prices, which seems an arduous task given the unobservability of much of agents’ information,
I propose to look instead at comovements between prices (or, equivalently, implied discount
rates) and informational uncertainty, and assess the consistency of such comovements with
either of the two theories: investors’ sentiments or rational markets. This approach, thus,
identifies uncertainty as the key variable that can help disentangle the two sources of price
movements, by focusing on the differential effect that changes in uncertainty about future
payoffs can be expected to have on prices through the two different channels, sentiments and
risk premia.
To this end, I employ a novel way to model sentiments, first proposed in [16, Berardi
(2020)]: sentiments are sparked by exogenous shocks, but they are amplified through uncer-
tainty. This modelling device captures the intuitive feature that agents can only be optimistic
or pessimistic about things they don’t know for sure. If investors knew with certainty the
future stream of dividends an asset entitles to, there could be no sentiments as no-one would
be willing to pay a price different from its fundamental value. As uncertainty increases,
agents can become more and more optimistic or pessimistic about the value of the asset and
thus the price they are willing to pay for it can deviate more and more from the fundamental.
Without sentiments, an increase in uncertainty can be expected to always decrease prices,
through an increase in risk premia: higher uncertainty about future payoffs, in fact, increases
the risk for investors who decide to buy that asset, and thus requires higher risk premia.
Different is instead the effect that uncertainty can be expected to have on prices through
sentiments, depending on the nature of those sentiments: while an increase in uncertainty
amplifies sentiments, such sentiments can result in higher or lower prices depending on their
bullish or bearish nature. A decrease in uncertainty has the opposite effect, increasing prices
through a lower risk premium (i.e., a higher discount rate) but again leading to an ambiguous
effect through sentiments: it increases prices if sentiments are negative, and it decreases prices
if sentiments are positive. Either way, a negative correlation between changes in uncertainty
and changes in prices is consistent with both theories, while a positive correlation requires
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sentiments (in particular, positive sentiments) to be present. This new framework allows then
for a clear identification of sentiments in the data: a positive correlation between uncertainty
and prices requires (positive) sentiments to be accounted for.
The crucial issue, then, is how to measure investors’ uncertainty. To this end, I compute a
measure of agents’ estimates about the fundamental value of the asset, and thus a measure of
their uncertainty, based on one source of information only: dividends. In reality investors are
likely to use many more sources of information, which can reduce their level of uncertainty.
The measure I derive, thus, can be considered as an upper bound for the total uncertainty
they face. This is not necessarily a problem for the empirical application of the model,
since the identification strategy for sentiments that I suggest relies on correctly identifying
movements in uncertainty, not its overall amount: as long as the direction of change is
correctly identified, the testable implications of the model are valid. What is required, then,
is that the informational content of other sources used by agents is not negatively correlated
with the informational content of dividends. As long as that is the case, and there seems to
be no reason to think otherwise, the measure of uncertainty I compute moves together with
the overall uncertainty faced by investors, and the framework I propose can be used in order
to identify (positive) sentiments in stock prices.
Another implicit assumption required for the proposed identification strategy to work is
that investors’ (absolute) risk aversion does not decrease when uncertainty increases (and
viceversa). Without this assumption, an increase in uncertainty matched by a stronger
decrease in risk aversion could generate a reduction in the risk premium and lead to wrong
inference regarding the presence of sentiments on the market.
With these caveats in mind, the proposed framework provides testable restrictions that
can help understand whether excessive movements in prices come from variations in discount
rates (i.e., risk premia) or from investors’ sentiments. Using data for the S&P 500 index and
dividends from 1872 onwards, I find evidence that sentiments played a role in determining
stock prices, since the observed positive comovements of prices and uncertainty cannot be
explained by the rational response of risk averse investors to changes in uncertainty.
1.2 Related literature
The role of information in financial markets has been a centre of attention of financial econo-
mists for a long time. [29, Fama (1970)] reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on
the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) in its various forms and concluded that, generally,
stock prices reflect all available information. Fama’s results generated a lot of interest and
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spurred further research. Attempts to find evidence in favour of either market efficiency or in-
vestors’ irrationality require a theoretical framework that can generate falsifiable predictions
using observable variables and two main approaches were taken: volatility tests (e.g., [42,
Shiller (1981)], [20, Campbell and Shiller (1988)]), to assess whether prices are too volatile
compared to the underlying fundamental value implied by rational investment decisions; and
returns regressions (for an overview, [41, Rapach and Zhou (2013)]), to identify variables that
could help predict future returns, thus disproving the EMH. The two approaches are, in fact,
equivalent ([36, LeRoy and Porter (1981)], [23, Cochrane (1991)]), and both are tests of spe-
cific discount rate models. To various degrees, these tests have so far rejected the rationality
hypothesis. While early volatility tests used to be carried out with constant discount rates,
subsequent studies incorporated time-varying models of discount factors. For example, [20,
Campbell and Shiller (1988)] construct volatility tests based on the consumption-based asset
pricing model, and their tests continue to reject the rationality hypothesis.
Given the relative stability of risk-free rates, accounting for time-varying discount rates
that can generate enough volatility in prices requires explaining substantial time variation
in the equity risk premium (ERP).1 Numerous attempts have been made to this end, using
a variety of variables, from financial indicators such as dividend-price ratios, book-to-market
ratios and various interest rates, to macroeconomic variables at business cycles frequencies,
such as inflation rates, income, consumption and wealth. For example, [21, Campbell and
Shiller (1998)] find that valuation ratios, such as the price-dividend ratio, have predictive
power over long run stock market returns, and [37, Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)] find that
the consumption-wealth ratio is a particularly good predictor of excess returns.2 Opposite
conclusions are instead reached by [33, Goyal and Welch (2008)], who find that none of these
variables is robust to out-of-sample prediction and could not help investors improve their
performance.
As said before, the residual left unexplained by these approaches can represent a short-
coming of current models, or genuinely capture irrational elements in stock markets. At-
tempts to analyse the impact of irrational exuberance and sentiments in stock prices include
[46, White (1990)], [25, DeLong and Shleifer (1991)], [10, Barberis et al (1998)] and [11,
1([28, Duarte and Rosa (2015)] conduct a review of models used to explain the ERP, classifying twenty
different models into five categories, based on their underlying assumptions: models that use historical mean
of realized returns, models based on discounted dividends, cross-sectional regressions, time-series regressions,
and surveys.
2More in general, [24, Cochrane (2017)] discusses how macro factors can (or cannot) help solve anomalies
in asset pricing.
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Barberis et al (2015)].3
Given the difficulty in identifying sentiments, and in particular disentangling the direc-
tion of causality from psychological attitudes to actual outcomes, economists have tried to
instrument for sentiments using a variety of variables. For example, [15, Benhabib and
Spiegel (2019)] look for empirical evidence on the impact of sentiment on aggregate demand
by using political outcomes as instruments and [35, Lagerborg et al. (2019)] try to capture
psychological attitudes in U.S. consumer confidence using fatalities in mass shootings. An
alternative approach has been to derive measures of sentiments using various surveys. For
example, [19, Brown and Cliff (2005)] show how a direct measure of investor sentiments,
the bull/bear spread from the Investor’s Intelligence survey, can account for deviations of
prices from intrinsic values. Evidence that survey measures capture at least some aspects
of investors’ psychological attitudes is also provided by [34, Lansing (2019)], who develops a
real business cycle model with both fundamental shocks and an equity sentiment shock that
captures fluctuations driven by animal spirits and shows that such model-identified sentiment
shock is indeed highly correlated with survey-based measures of US consumer sentiments.
Scholars have also looked at historical evidence on particular market episodes to assess
whether increases in stock prices were driven purely by the irrational exuberance of investors
or were instead rooted in rising fundamental values. For example, [32, Freher et al (2013)],
through cross-sectional analysis of stock prices, find that the 1720 boom was based on eco-
nomic fundamentals, such as financial innovations and the increase in trans-Atlantic trade;
[39, Nicholas (2008)] analyses cross-sectional data on patents in the 1920s and finds that
firms with valuable patents did indeed rise relatively more than other firms prior to the 1929
crash; and [40, Pástor and Veronesi (2009)] look at cross-sectional historical data on the 19th
century railroad boom in the United States and find that technological innovations had an
important role in driving up stock prices of railroad companies.
Learning and bounded rationality have also been used to account for the large volatility
of prices and for deviation of markets from fundamental values. Examples of such approaches
include [12, Barsky and De Long (1993)], [18, Brennan and Xia (2001)], [17, Branch and
Evans (2011)], [2, Adam et al (2016)] and [1, Adam et al (2016)]. Contrary to the sentiments
literature, investors are not usually considered irrational in this approach, and the additional
variation in prices required to match the data comes from changing beliefs over time due to
3For a comprehensive review of this approach, see [8, Baker and Wurgler (2007)]. More in general,
behavioral approaches to asset pricing have been discussed in [9, Barberis and Thaler (2003)] and, more
recently, in [45, Shiller (2014)]. For an earlier critical view, see [30, Fama (1998)].
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limited information and learning. Heterogeneity of beliefs among traders can also give rise
to speculative excesses, especially when short selling is limited (as in [38, Miller (1977)]).
Finally, terms such as irrational exuberance and sentiments should not be confused with
the idea of bubbles, and in particular of rational bubbles. Rational bubbles, in fact, require
strict conditions for their existence, as shown in [27, Diba and Grossman (1988b)], and [26,
Diba and Grossman (1988a)] do not find evidence of their existence in stock prices.
2 The model
I start from a fundamental model of asset prices, where the fair price of an asset is given by





Here fLIt denotes the fundamental value of the asset under limited information for agents, as
they don’t know the future stream of dividends; βt,t+i represents the discount rate between
period t and t+ i, with its inverse given by the t-period risk free rate plus a risk adjustment
factor, the risk premium. The expectational operator Et is taken with respect to the infor-
mation set available to agents. If the price of the asset, pt, does not include sentiments, it
should be equal to fLIt .
Equation (1) allows for time-varying discount rates and a terms structure of discount
rates. I will assume, though, that at each period t, the i-period discount rate, βt,t+i, is the
compounded one period rate, βt,t+1, simply denoted βt; that is βt,t+i = β
i
t. I will therefore
abstract from the term structure of discount rates and focus on the time-varying aspect
instead.
At each time t, in order to compute the fair price, given a certain discount rate βt, agents
need to form expectations about the future stream of dividends entitled to by the asset. I
will now present assumptions about the dividends process and agents’ information structure.
2.1 Dividends process and information
I assume that dividends include a permanent and a transient component. The permanent
component is meant to represent the time-varying fundamental value of the firm, its ability to
generate profits, while the transient component might capture temporary elements affecting
dividends, such as variations in the dividends distribution policy of the firm. Agents only
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observe current and past dividends, but need to disentangle the two components in order to
predict future dividends and thus compute the fundamental value of the asset.
Denoting dividends with dt, the permanent component with θt and the transient compo-
nent with et:
dt = θt + et. (2)




while the permanent component evolves according to the equation
θt = ρt−1θt−1 + vt−1, (3)





. The AR(1) parameter is allowed to be time-varying and modelled as
ρt = ρt−1 + zt−1, (4)





vt and zt can be (contemporaneously) correlated with each other, but independent of et.
Variances and covariances of all shocks are allowed to be time-varying: both the precision
of agents’ information and the volatility of the state variables can change over time, giving
rise to time-varying uncertainty in agents’ expectations.
Estimates for θt and ρt will be derived by agents through a non-linear Kalman filter,
which allows them to use their information optimally in this context.
2.2 Fundamental value with limited information
If investors were to have full information, observing θt and ρt, the rational expectations, full





where the superscript FI denotes full information. Agents, though, do not have full infor-
mation, as they are uncertain about θt and ρt and can only observe dividends.
Given the assumptions stated above about the discount rate, equation (1) can be rewritten
as





where Et = E [• | It], with It the information set of agents at time t, now given by {dj}j≤t.





The framework presented in (2.1) implies that




tEtθt + cov(vt, zt). (6)
In order to compute such expectations, I will use the approximationEt [f (ρt)] ' f (Et [ρt]),
so Et [ρ
i
t] ' Et [ρt]
i, using a first order Taylor expansion around Et [ρt], with the linear term





tEtθt + cov(vt, zt) ' Et [ρt]
iEt [θt] + cov(vt, zt).
Given then the assumed model for dividends and information structure, the optimal estimates
for θt and ρt, Et [ρt] and Et [θt], can be derived through an extended Kalman filter (EKF)




tθ̂t + cov(vt, zt), (7)
with cov(vt, zt) also provided by the EKF algorithm.













The uncertainty related to such estimate for the fundamental value is denoted σ2I,t and
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3 Beliefs and uncertainty
3.1 Formation of beliefs: extended Kalman filter
Given the assumed state-space model for dividends, presented in (2), (3) and (4), the optimal
way for agents to form expectations about future dividends, and thus the fundamental value
of the asset, is through an EKF, which allows for the estimation of current values of the
unobservable θt and ρt based on the history of dividends up to time t.
For convenience, I rewrite here the state-space system describing the evolution of the
state variables θt and ρt and the observation/measurement equation for dividends here:
θt = ρt−1θt−1 + vt−1 (10)
ρt = ρt−1 + zt−1 (11)
dt = θt + et, (12)
with (10) and (11) representing the state or transition equations and (12) the measurement
equation.
It is worth noting here that since the only information used by agents is common (i.e.,
dividends), realised prices do not represent an additional source of information above and
beyond the exogenous information conveyed by dividends.
Since the system (10)-(11) is nonlinear, the EKF implements an approximation around
the current estimates of means and covariances. For a detailed derivation of the equations













the system can be represented as
xt = F (xt−1) + εt−1 (13)
dt = h (xt) + et. (14)
This system is then approximated on the basis of a linear Taylor approximation of F (xt−1)
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t = Qt, Eete
′
t = Rt and given appropriate initial conditions x̂0, ρ̂0, θ̂0,Σ0, the
EKF algorithm is given by:
1. State estimates time update:
x̂−t = F (x̂t−1) .





















5. State estimate measurement update: defining the measurement innovation κt = dt−d̂t,
x̂t = x̂
−
t + Ltκt. (15)
6. Error covariance measurement update (posterior error covariance)
Σt = (I − LtC) Σ
−
t .
4To be precise, in the present system function h does not need to be approximated, as it is already in
linear form.
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The standard derivation of the EKF filter is based on the assumption that the time-
varying variance covariance matrices of state and observation noise, Qt−1 and Rt, are known.
When this is not the case, such matrices can be estimated adaptively over time. To this end,
I will follow the methodology outlined in [4, Akhlaghi et al (2017)]:
1. Residual based adaptive estimation of Rt:






This term is then approximated adaptively using the observed η2t and a forgetting factor
0 < α ≤ 1:








The update can be implemented from t = 2 on, for an appropriate guess R̂1.
2. Innovation based adaptive estimation of Qt−1:
From (13),
εt−1 = xt − F (xt−1)
and using (15) one can write,























which can be estimated adaptively, using time averages and a forgetting factor α:








for an appropriate guess Q̂0.
3.2 Measuring uncertainty
Uncertainty is the key variable in the proposed methodology to disentangle sentiments from
variations in risk premia and its measurement is thus particularly important. In particular,
(9) defines uncertainty as the variance of the information based fundamental value. Having
defined the structure of the system and the information available to agents, it is now possible
to compute such value.
The EKF procedure provides estimates for the posterior variance and covariance of the
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where θ̂t and ρ̂t are the EKF estimates for θt and ρt respectively.
In order to compute σ2I,t from these variances and covariances, I derive a second order
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The variable σ2I,t thus captures the total uncertainty of the estimated fundamental value.




θρ,t, and on the estimated θ̂t and ρ̂t, besides
the (known) βt. This dependency is due to the nonlinearities in f
LI
t .
In the empirical analysis, I will also use the EKF variances σ2θ,t and σ
2
ρ,t as a measure
for uncertainty: the reason is that, since βt is computed as a residual from actual prices, a
positive correlation of σ2I,t with prices might arise mechanically and it might not necessarily
be driven by changes in uncertainty. The measure σ2θ,t and σ
2
ρ,t are instead completely
exogenous from prices and necessarily reflect changes in uncertainty.
4 The role of uncertainty
Sentiments and time-varying risk premia are two ways to explain the residual movement
in prices not justified by changes in expected dividends or payoffs, one attributing it to
irrational behavior of investors and the other to their rational decision making.
For any given series of prices and dividends, one can come up with an appropriate series
of risk premia which justifies prices as the fundamental value of the asset. The question then
becomes whether the implied variation in risk premia is reasonable or not, according to some
specific model of rational investor behavior.
I propose in this work a method to distinguish the two possible sources of price varia-
tion, sentiments and risk premia, through their relationship with uncertainty. This strategy
amounts to assess the comovements between implied risk premia and uncertainty: if senti-
ments are not present, risk premia should respond to changes in perceived risk only; if prices
instead include a sentiments component, this will be captured by the implied risk premium
(since it is computed as a residual) and can thus make such variable move in ways that are
not consistent with rational risk averse behavior.
4.1 Time-varying risk premia
Rates used to discount future dividends depend on two components: the real risk-free rate,
it, and the risk premium (erpt):
β−1t = rt = it + erpt. (17)
As the risk premium compensates for risk, it should depend positively on the perceived
riskiness of the asset, and therefore on the uncertainty of its estimated fundamental value.
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If there was no uncertainty and the fundamental value of the asset was known for sure, there
would be no risk: investors would know precisely the payoffs they were going to receive from
their investment. The larger is the uncertainty about the future stream of dividends, and
thus about the fundamental value, the riskier is the asset and therefore the higher is the
compensation required by investors, i.e., the risk premium.
Besides on the amount of risk, the risk premium should depend also on the price of risk,
that is the degree of (absolute) risk aversion of investors. I abstract from this element here,
effectively treating risk aversion as constant. This semplification will not create problems in
my empirical application of the model, as long as risk aversion does not systematically move
in the opposite direction of risk. If this was the case, an observed increase in risk, matched
by an even stronger reduction in risk aversion, could lead to a decrease in the risk premium,
rather than an increase, and lead to wrong conclusions regarding the presence of sentiments
on the market.





, with σ2I,t given by (9). (17) thus becomes













> 0 and dβt
dσ2
I,t




< 0: an increase in uncertainty should always
decrease prices through the risk premium channel.
4.2 Sentiments
Besides reflecting the limited information fundamental value fLIt , prices can include also
an irrational component, sentiments, determined by the psychological attitudes of investors.
That is, agents’ beliefs about the value of an asset can deviate from information based
estimates, and such beliefs are reflected into prices.
Denoting sentiments as St, prices are made up of two components:
pt = f
LI
t + St. (19)
The key modelling device I introduce at this point is to explicitly link sentiments to
5This terminology is not consistent with the classical distinction between risk and uncertainty, depending
on known or unknown probabilities of future events, as the risk premium depends here on the amount of
uncertainty, as measured by the variance of the estimate fundamental value.
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where st is a stochastic variable that represents a sentiment shock (not necessarily i.i.d.)
deriving from investors’ psychological attitudes. A positive value for st captures investors’





combines those attitudes with uncertainty, determining the magnitude
of sentiments, and has the following properties:
1. h(0, .) = 0: there can be no sentiments when there is no uncertainty, as one cannot be
optimistic or pessimistic about something it is known for sure;
2. sign (h(., st)) = sign(st): whether investors are optimistic or pessimistic is determined








= sign(st): an increase in uncertainty amplifies sentiments, in either
direction.








st, γ > 0,
though I will not impose such restriction in the empirical analysis.
The proposed representation (20) captures the idea that sentiments are sparked by ex-
ogenous shocks to beliefs, represented by investors’ psychological attitudes, but can only
propagate to prices through uncertainty. There can be no sentiments when agents know
with certainty the value of an asset, as no-one would be willing to buy the asset at a higher
price or sell it at a lower price than its fundamental value. It is the uncertainty about the
intrinsic value of the asset that makes sentiments possible, and the larger is that uncertainty,
the more prices can deviate from the rational, information based, fundamental value.










The first component on the right hand side captures the impact of uncertainty on prices
through changes in the discount factor, i.e., through risk premia, and the second component
captures the impact through sentiments.
6This characterization of sentiments has been originally proposed in [16, Berardi (2020)].
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This framework then allows one to derive testable implications for the presence of senti-
ments in asset prices, which I will present in the following Section (4.3).
4.3 Testable restrictions for identifying sentiments
According to the model of risk premium developed in Sections (4.1), the first component
of (21), dfLIt /dσ
2
I,t, is always negative: an increase (decrease) in uncertainty increases (de-
creases) the risk premium, decreasing (increasing) βt and thus having a depressing (expan-
sionary) effect on prices. Without sentiments (i.e., St ≡ 0), thus, one would expect to see








With sentiments, instead, an additional effect of uncertainty on prices is present. The
second component in (21), dSt/dσ
2
I,t, can be either positive or negative, depending on the
sign of st, according to the framework developed in Section (4.2). With positive psychological
attitudes (optimism), i.e„ st > 0, increased (reduced) uncertainty leads to larger (smaller)
sentiments, as dSt/dσ
2
I,t > 0: if strong enough, this effect can dominate the negative impact
on prices of the increased risk premium and lead to an overall increase in prices. With
negative psychological attitudes (pessimism), i.e., st < 0, increased (reduced) uncertainty
leads instead to smaller (larger) sentiments (that is, larger in absolute value, but negative)
since dSt/dσ
2
I,t < 0: sentiments now act in the same direction as risk premia, depressing
prices. Positive comovements between changes in uncertainty and changes in prices, thus,
require sentiments (and in particular, positive sentiments) to be present, as they cannot be
generated by changes in risk premia alone. Negative comovements instead can be generated
by risk premia alone, though they do not rule out sentiments.
These are the model restrictions that I will be using in order to identify sentiments in
stock prices and distinguish between the two alternative explanations for price movements.




< 0, this means that after an increase (decrease) in uncertainty, a lower
(higher) risk premium is required to match prices with the limited information fundamental
value, implying that prices have increased (decreased). Again, this would be inconsistent
with the theory of rational investors, and would require sentiments to be present. Looking
at implied risk premia rather than prices has the advantage to clean out the effect of changes
in the risk free rate, though there is no reason to expect them to be related to changes in
uncertainty.
In order to test these restrictions in the data, I will look at the relation between uncer-
tainty on one side, and prices and implied risk premia on the other side, using S&P 500 data
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from 1872 till 2019. A positive correlation between uncertainty and prices would require
sentiments to be explained, while a negative one would be consistent with rational investors’
behavior (while not necessarily ruling out sentiments). Similarly, a negative correlation be-
tween implied risk premia and uncertainty would point to the presence of sentiments in stock
prices.
5 Empirical analysis
I now apply the theoretical framework developed so far to historical financial data and see
if it possible to identify the presence of sentiments in stock prices. In particular, I use
historical data for the S&P 500 index and dividends, constructed by Schiller and available
on his webpage at: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. I use annual data, inflation
adjusted, covering the period 1872-2019.
First, from the historical series of dividends, I compute investors’ real time estimates of






θρ,t through the EKF procedure outlined
before. For the smoothing parameter in the adaptive estimation of variance covariance
matrices, I set α = .75. This value generates enough variability in estimated uncertainty
while still guaranteeing good behavior of the whole algorithm. I also initialize all variance
covariance matrices according to their long-run mean.
With estimates from the EKF procedure, I then use historical data for the S&P 500 index
and equate it to the limited information fundamental value according to equation (8), thus
computing the implied series for the discount rate βt, and therefore for rt = β
−1
t . Using then
Shiller’s historical data for the real long term government bond yield, as a proxy for the real
risk-free rate it, I use (18) to derive the series for the implied risk premium erpt.
As noted before, in addition to the measure of uncertainty represented by σ2I,t, computed
through (16), I will also use the EKF variances σ2θ,t and σ
2
ρ,t.
7 These estimates are an addi-
tional measure for investors’ uncertainty, and have the desirable property of being exogenous
to the pricing model used. This means that, contrary to σ2I,t, they are independent of βt,
which is derived as a residual. While movements in σ2I,t might come entirely from movements
in βt required to match observed prices, thus introducing spurious correlation between σ
2
I,t




ρ,t are solely due to changes in the precision of the EKF
estimates, thus ensuring exogeneity with respect to prices.
7Note that σ2θ,t and σ
2
ρ,t are strongly correlated with each other, given that the filtering procedure is
based on a unique common observable, dividends.
Uncertainty, sentiments and time-varying risk premia

















Figure 1: S&P 500 index, dividends and P/D ratio. Source for prices and dividends:
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm
Before presenting results on the comovements between uncertainty and prices, I present
a visual summary of the data and the outcomes from the EKF procedure.
Fig. 1 displays the S&P 500 index, dividends and the price dividends ratio. It can be
seen that particularly from the second half of the 1990’, prices and dividends diverge, with
a significant increase in the price dividends ratio.
Fig. 2 presents the evolution of investors’ estimates for θ̂t and ρ̂t coming from the EKF
filtering procedure based on current and past dividends at each point in time.
Fig. (3) then presents the evolution of uncertainty, as σ2θ,t, σ
2
ρ,t and σI,t.
Finally, Fig. 4 presents estimates for the implied equity risk premium, erpt: the overall
average for the whole period is 3.82% and it can be seen that the volatility of the implied
risk premium has gone down substantially from the late 1980’, with also a somewhat smaller
average. As the volatility of prices requires much less variation in implied risk premia to
be accounted for in recent years, sentiments that were computed from the residual variation
in the risk premium not accounted for by some model of discount rates would show less
volatility.
I now turn to the analysis of comovement patterns between uncertainty and prices. With-
out sentiments, one would expect to find a negative correlation between prices and uncer-
tainty measures, as discussed above. A positive correlation, instead, would point to the
presence of sentiments in S&P 500 prices.
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Figure 2: Estimates for θ̂t and ρ̂t computed using the EKF procedure and equation (16).
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Figure 3: Measures of uncertainty: σ2θ,t, σ
2
ρ,t and σI,t
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Figure 4: Implied risk premium (erpt).
As said, I measure uncertainty as the variance of agents’ estimated value for the asset,
based only on information represented by the stream of past and current dividends at each
time, which can be assumed to be common knowledge for investors. This measure of uncer-
tainty, thus, is greater than or equal to the total uncertainty agents really faced, as other
sources of information (both public and private) might have been used that would have re-
duced the uncertainty of agents’ estimates. This limitation, though, does not represent a
problem for my analysis, as long as the precision of unobserved information is not negatively
correlated with the precision of the information from dividends. That is, it must not be the
case that, when uncertainty from dividends increased (decreased), the informational content
of other variables increased (decreased) and compensated for it. There is no reason to believe
that this would be the case.
I start with the regression,
pt = b0 + b1 log(σ
2
I,t),
whose results are in Table 1.
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Table 1: Output for regression pt = b0 + b1 log(σ
2
I,t)
It can be seen that the coefficient on the measure of uncertainty log(σ2I,t) is positive and
significant: prices increase with uncertainty. This result, as explained above, is not consistent
with rational investors, and points to the presence of sentiments in the S&P 500 index.
For robustness, I run the additional regression
pt = b0 + b1 log(σ
2
I,t) + b2ρ̂t + b3θ̂t,
where now estimates ρ̂t and θ̂t are included among the regressors. Results are reported in
Table 2. As it can be seen, findings from the previous regression are confirmed here, with the
coefficient on measured uncertainty still positive and significant. In addition, the coefficient
on θ̂t has the expected sign, while the coefficient on ρ̂t seems to go against intuition.
Table 2: Output for regression pt = b0 + b1 log(σ
2
I,t) + b2ρ̂t + b3θ̂t
As said, the use of σ2I,t as measure of uncertainty might introduce spurious correlation with
prices. I therefore run the following regression next:




θ,t + b3ρ̂t + b3θ̂t.
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Results are reported in Table 3: the coefficient on σ2ρ,t is positive and highly significant,
confirming the previous positive correlation between uncertainty and prices. The coefficient
on σ2θ,t is instead negative, but not significant. The sign on ρ̂t is still puzzling.




θ,t + b3ρ̂t + b3θ̂t
I now investigate the correlation between implied risk premia and uncertainty. Looking at
the movements in implied risk premia, in addition to prices, is important because prices
could be reacting to a larger set of unobserved factors, while risk premia, by definition,
should depend only on risk. I first run the regression
erpt = b0 + b1 log(σ
2
I,t),
whose results are in Table 4. It can be seen that the coefficient on measured uncertainty is
negative and highly significant: increases in uncertainty correspond to decreases in implied
risk premia. This result means that when uncertainty increases, implied risk premia have to
decrease in order for the expected dividends discount model to match observed prices: as this
goes against our understanding of the behavior of risk premia, it suggests that sentiments
were present and compensated for the depressing effect that risk premia had when uncertainty
increased.
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Table 4: Output for regression: erpt = b0 + b1 log(σ
2
I,t)
I then use the alternative measures of uncertainty, σ2ρ,t and σ
2
θ,t in the same regression on
risk premia:





Results are reported in Table 5: coefficients on both σ2ρ,t and σ
2
θ,t are negative, confirm-
ing results from the previous regression, though only the one on σ2ρ,t is significant at 95%
confidence level.





Results from this empirical analysis thus suggest that sentiments systematically affected
S&P 500 prices over the sample period. The fact that I find evidence of a positive im-
pact of uncertainty on prices (and of a negative impact on implied risk premia) implies
that investors’ sentiments were largely positive over the sample period: when uncertainty
increased, investors’ optimism about the value of the asset would drive up prices despite
the contemporaneous increase in risk premia. This does not necessarily imply that investors
would systematically expect prices to rise, as expectations are formed here on the value of
the asset rather than on its future price, though it would seem reasonable to expect some
strong correlation between the two. Evidence from the American Association of Individual
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Figure 5: Years with negative comovements between erpt and σ
2
I,t.
Investors survey indeed shows that over the period 1987 - 2020, the proportion of bullish
investors has been 7.4% higher than that of bearish ones, and out of those 34 years, the
annual average bull-bear spread has been positive for 30 years, with only four years in which
investors have been more bearish than bullish. This evidence suggests that indeed investors
tend to be more optimistic than pessimistic, on average, regarding stock prices.
In order to try and identify specific periods where sentiments affected prices, I select
years in which changes in uncertainty and changes in implied risk premia had the opposite
sign. Using σ2I,t as a measure of uncertainty, negative comovements with implied risk premia
were observed in 79 years (out of 148). This is reported in Fig (5). Using instead σ2ρ,t and
σ2θ,t as measures of uncertainty, in 57 occasions both measures of uncertainty moved in the
same direction and opposite to the implied risk premium while only in 33 years the three
moved in the same direction.
6 Conclusions
I have proposed in this paper a new way to look at the sources of volatility in stock prices.
By modelling sentiments as uncertainty amplified shocks (psychological attitudes), and iso-
lating the effect that changes in uncertainty should have on prices through sentiments and
risk premia, I am able to derive testable implications that can help detect the presence of
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sentiments on financial markets. Looking at historical data for the S&P 500 index and divi-
dends through the lenses of this new framework, I find evidence that investors’ psychological
attitudes have played an important role in determining movements in stock prices over the
last 150 years. The observed positive comovements between uncertainty and prices could
not have been generated by the rational response of investors to changes in risk, and require
instead the presence of an irrational component to be explained.
Uncertainty, sentiments and time-varying risk premia
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